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ABSTRACT
In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger claims that one can obtain an authentic identity by
way of the resolute anticipation of death. With this proper relation to one’s finitude, one’s
understanding will no longer be obscured by entanglement in the world, and the world can
be genuinely seen as it is according to the tradition that supports one’s understanding.
Following Charles Taylor in The Ethics of Authenticity, I argue that Heidegger’s account
of authenticity fails to incorporate the necessary role of recognition by the community in
the formation of an authentic identity. Because of the deeply personal nature of one’s
relation to one’s death, authenticity cannot be recognized by the community; therefore, the
distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity appears meaningless to others. In Truth
and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer is able to satisfy Taylor’s recognition requirement for
the formation of authentic identity. I argue that for Gadamer, one obtains an authentic
identity if one is able to ‘fuse horizons’ with another. For Gadamer, authenticity is not a
magical transformation of one’s understanding that takes place with the anticipation of
death; rather, one can understand the world authentically when the prejudices that block
understanding are worked out in the process of understanding itself. When we encounter
those that are different or other, we must struggle to understand and recognize them on
their own terms (and vice versa) by working out our prejudicial limitations in a process of
genuine dialogue and discourse with these others. This is what Gadamer calls fusing
horizons. I argue that this fusion of horizons satisfies Taylor’s recognition requirement
since the genuine mutual recognition of others, and by others, is necessary work in
achieving authentic understanding and identity.
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INTRODUCTION
Gadamer presents a concept of understanding in Truth and Method that is very similar to
Heidegger’s concept of understanding in Being and Time. And although Heidegger’s discussion
of authenticity is important to his concept of understanding, Gadamer manages to avoid the
problems that I find with Heidegger’s distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity.1
For Heidegger, authenticity is obtained by relating to one’s death in the proper way. In
this proper relation to death, one discovers death in a deeply personal way as the necessary limit
to one’s own existence. By discovering this, one is compelled to reject the limitations to one’s
being that are imposed by others, and one can learn to live for one’s self and not for others’
approval. Therefore, in order to be authentic on Heidegger’s account, one must turn away from
the world of the ‘they’ (the community) and turn inward toward oneself.
On Charles Taylor’s account of authenticity in The Ethics of Authenticity, one cannot turn
away from the community in order to develop authentically. For Taylor, the role of the
community in the formation of an authentic identity is to recognize the legitimacy of others
within common ‘horizons of significance.’ Through these shared horizons of significance,
individuals can understand themselves in terms of what they also recognize in others. According
to Taylor, without this recognition, our authentic identity is meaningless.
Following Taylor, I argue that Heidegger’s account of authenticity fails to consider the
role of recognition by the community in the formation of a meaningful authentic identity. For
Heidegger, with the resolute anticipation of death, one sheds the ‘they self’ (the self prescribed to
one by the community). In shedding the they self, one loses touch with the community of others
as well as what these others find meaningful. However, despite that loss of meaning, an authentic
individual must still exist in the community and live out his or her finite existence like everyone
else.

1

Although Heidegger did change his position on this issue in his later work, I can only deal with Being and
Time in the scope of this paper.
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The problem that I find with Heidegger’s account of authenticity is that the community
cannot tell the difference between what is authentic and what is inauthentic. As I will explain, in
requiring that one turn away from the community and toward oneself in order to be authentic,
Heidegger demands that the authentic individual cut itself off in some way from the community’s
shared ‘horizons of significance.’ The horizon of significance that gives meaning to an authentic
individual must be formed outside of the community’s shared horizons, since it is something
deeply personal (i.e. the understanding of one’s death as the limitation of one’s own existence);
because of this, what makes one authentic cannot be recognized as meaningful by the community.
Due to the absence of recognition by the community on Heidegger’s account, one’s authentic
identity has no meaning.
Gadamer modifies Heidegger’s account of understanding in a way that avoids the
problems that I find with Heidegger’s authenticity/inauthenticity distinction. For Heidegger,
authentic understanding is a matter of letting being freely reveal itself. Others can limit this
understanding, but we must shed these limitations in order to be authentic. For Gadamer,
authentic understanding is a matter of seeing the world as it is within a tradition that we rely on to
understand (an account that is very similar to Heidegger’s). For Gadamer, this mode of being is
only possible by way of what he characterizes as the ‘fusion of horizons.’ This means that things
in the world will reveal themselves within a shared meaning structure (what Taylor would call a
common horizon of significance). For Gadamer, we make sense of others in a genuine way
through a back and forth play of dialogue and discussion; this dialogue and discussion weeds out
the prejudices that limit our understanding by finding and grasping the common traditional and
cultural prejudices that allow the other to speak for him or herself in an authentic way. This
common tradition and culture is realized and grasped in the fusion of horizons, which produces
authentic self-understanding through recognition of the other along common (community rooted)
horizons of significance. This fusion provides a means of recognition between an authentic
individual and the community that gives one’s authentic identity meaning. On Gadamer’s
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account, the community is necessary for authentic understanding, and not a just a hindrance to it
in the way that it is for Heidegger. Because Gadamer’s concept of authentic understanding as
fusing horizons accounts for community recognition in the formation of a meaningful authentic
identity, Gadamer avoids the problems associated with Heidegger’s distinction between
authenticity and inauthenticity.
This paper will proceed as follows. ‘Chapter One’ will discuss the problems of the
authenticity-inauthenticity distinction in Heidegger’s Being and Time. I will then sharpen my
criticism by drawing on Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity. ‘Chapter Two’ will discuss
Gadamer’s idea of authentic understanding as the fusion of horizons in Truth and Method, and
how this fusion satisfies Taylor’s criterion of recognition. Finally, I will sum up my argument in a
short Conclusion.
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CHAPTER ONE
Being and Time is Heidegger’s work on the meaning of ‘being.’ To avoid confusion we
can distinguish between two senses of the term being. What I call being [das Seiende] is simply
what something is. For Heidegger, the being [das Seiende] of a thing is what that thing does, or
the function it performs. For example, the being [das Seiende] of a hammer is hammering, i.e.
what the hammer does. Being [Sein] on the other hand is characterized as that which makes
beings [das Seiende] intelligible or understandable as what they are. It is the frame within which
we encounter things. So being [Sein] is what allows the being [das Seiende] of hammer to be
intelligible as what it is (a thing that hammers) in our encounters of it. For Heidegger meaning is
“that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself” (Heidegger, 2010, p.146-147). So
Heidegger is trying to find that wherein the intelligibility of what it is that makes beings [das
Seiende] intelligible as beings [das Seiende] maintains itself. We could also say that he is trying
to make sense or find the meaning of what it is that allows for a hammer to be encountered
intelligibly as a thing that hammers. In other words, he is trying to make intelligible that which
makes beings [das Seiende] intelligible. Therefore, Heidegger is trying to find the meaning of
being [Sein]2
In his interpretation of the meaning of being [Sein], Heidegger tries to undermine what
he calls the ‘metaphysics of presence’ because he believes that the metaphysics of presence has
obscured the meaning of being [Sein]. The metaphysics of presence is an understanding of being
[Sein and das Seiende] in terms of a subject-object relation. One can describe the ‘metaphysics of
presence’ in terms of an objective, physical world of material objects that exists along with a
subjective mind that transcends or is somehow separate from this world. In Kant’s Critique of
Pure Reason for example, the mind can know the world by synthesizing representations or
concepts of things in the world; these concepts make the world intelligible to the mind. The
problem for Heidegger is that this ontological distinction tends to place that which makes beings
2

For the rest of the paper ‘Sein’ and ‘das Seiende’ will only be differentiated if necessary.
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[das Seiende] intelligible in the abstract ‘space’ of the mind, while ordinary physical objects are
placed outside of the mind in the ‘real’ world, thereby removing being [Sein] from the world.
This division between subject and object goes back at least to Plato and the distinction he makes
between ‘idea’ (subject) and ‘appearance’ (object). With Plato, that which makes things
intelligible (the form of the Good) exists in a completely separate ontological realm than the
world of appearance (making their interaction a problem). Heidegger’s tortured language in Being
and Time is meant to try to avoid these sorts of distinctions, which are deeply entrenched in the
history of Western philosophy.
In order to reconstitute or rediscover the meaning of being [Sein], Heidegger analyzes
certain features of the human experience (the human being) in a particular way. This (human)
being [das Seiende] is the being [das Seiende] with the ability to understand the meaning of being
[Sein] and then form an account of this understanding. In other words, human beings have the
being [Sein] for which beings [das Seiende] are intelligible as beings [das Seiende]. Therefore, in
order to find the meaning of being [Sein], Heidegger must analyze human experience in a way
that does not rely on the subject-object binaries of the metaphysics of presence.
By doing away with the metaphysics of presence, it follows that Heidegger must also do
away with the transcendental knowing subject as a field for his analysis of the human experience.
For Kant, the transcendental subject is the part of the human being that makes knowledge of
things in the world possible, but is nevertheless somehow separate from the world as it exists in
itself outside of the subject’s empirical experience of it (outside of what can be known). What
Heidegger turns to instead of the transcendental subject to find an appropriate way to investigate
the meaning of being is ‘Dasein.’ According to Sherman, “to describe human being as Dasein is
an attempt to leave behind philosophical notions of the individual as subject, and more broadly,
the subject-object duality of the individual and the world, that is, interior consciousness
juxtaposed against an objective world outside of it” (Sherman, 2009, p.1).
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What makes Dasein different from the transcendental subject found in the traditional
metaphysics of Western philosophy is the way that Dasein exists in relation to the world. This
world does not consist of objects that are objectively present, in the same way that Dasein is not a
transcendental subject that knows or experiences these objects through concepts or
representations. For Heidegger, Dasein and the world are not separate. Rather, Dasein –
characterized as ‘being-in-the-world,’ is absorbed in the world through everyday practical
involvement in it.
Dasein’s absorption in the world through practical involvement is what Heidegger calls
‘care,’ which is the being [das Seiende] of Dasein. This practical absorption into the world is
Dasein’s mode of being in a common or everyday way and is characterized by Heidegger as
‘everydayness.’ For Heidegger ‘care’ and ‘self’ are more or less synonyms. Much like the
hammer, Dasein’s being is practical, and who Dasein is (its self) is found in what it does. “Dasein
initially finds ‘itself’ in what it does, needs, expects, has charge of, in the things at hand which it
initially takes care of in the surrounding world” (Heidegger, 2010, p.116). For Heidegger, a
human being is brought forth or made as a kind of poēsis that is characterized as care. This
practical activity of care brings forth Dasein’s various modes of being by means of a vast array of
‘useful things.’ For example, a hammer is used to bring forth the mode of being a carpenter; this
mode of being is brought forth when a carpenter uses the hammer in the construction of a shed for
instance. Commonly, a hammer is understood as an inanimate object that is used by an animated
subject to hammer things. This subject is what animates the hammer and the hammer is
dependent and manipulated by the subject that uses it. However, this formulation of the
metaphysics of presence reduces the being of the hammer to its material status as an object
dependent on subjects to build and make use of them. For Heidegger, rather than understanding
useful things as objectively present tools, we should see useful things as beings that help bring
forth Dasein’s being. So instead of understanding the hammer as an inanimate object that is used
by a carpenter subject to bring forth a shed, the carpenter and the hammer are one in taking care
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of the shed (bringing forth the being of Dasein in the mode of carpenter). For Heidegger, the
hammer is ‘freed’ to be what it is when it is engaged in the act of hammering, which is its being
and function. At the same time, the carpenter is freed in the mode of being a carpenter to be what
it is when he or she uses the hammer. Neither the carpenter nor the hammer exist without one
another; their being depends on one another. So Dasein’s various modes of being are dependent
on a vast array of useful things and vice versa. This means that there is no subject that is distinct
from objects in the world, there is only the practical bringing forth of Dasein’s modes of being in
the activity of care.
For Heidegger, care is only possible if the world has a horizon of intelligibility that
makes sense to Dasein. This intelligibility relies on a network of meaning and practicality that
Heidegger calls the ‘worldliness’ of the world and characterizes as the ‘totality of relevance and
significance’ in the world. Remember, the world for Heidegger is not physical space occupied by
various physical objects that can be manipulated by subjects; rather, the world for Heidegger is
the way that Dasein meaningfully structures it via relations of relevance and significance. All
beings in the world, including Dasein, are related to one another. This relation is what Heidegger
calls ‘reference,’ which is characterized by ‘in-order-to.’ He writes “a useful thing is essentially
‘something in order to…’. The different kinds of ‘in order to’ such as serviceability, helpfulness,
suitability, handiness, constitute a totality of useful things. The structure of ‘in order to’ [‘um-zu’]
contains a reference [Verweisung] of something to something” (Heidegger, 2010, p.68). The
hammer is used ‘in order to’ hammer. This hammer is used along with other useful things like
nails, tape measures, planks, and etcetera when building a shed. These things refer to one another
and are understood as a totality of useful things used to build a shed. Understanding these
referential relations in the mode of being a carpenter is what Heidegger calls ‘circumspection’
(Heidegger, 2010, p.69).
These referential relations are structured by ‘relevance.’ “Beings are discovered with
regard to the fact that they are referred, as those beings which they are, to something. They are
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relevant together with something else” (Heidegger, 2010, p.82). The hammer, nails, boards, and
other tools and materials are relevant together in the construction of a shed. “To be relevant
means to let something be together with something else” (Heidegger, 2010, p.82). These
referential relations structured by relevance are part of a larger interconnected web of practicality
that Heidegger refers to as the ‘totality of relevance.’ This totality structures the relevance of
useful and functional things. For example, the construction of the shed exists within a larger
overall system or context of the construction industry, which provide standard hammers, nails,
boards, and etcetera along with the training and know-how to make these things relevant in the
mode of being a carpenter that is building a shed. “The total relevance which, for example,
constitutes the things at hand in a workshop in their handiness is ‘earlier’ than any single useful
thing” (Heidegger, 2010, p.82-83).
All relevance is given value by Dasein, the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ this totality is
organized. For example, the shed that I built in the mode of being a carpenter was constructed
(for example) to keep my lawn mower sheltered from the elements; this lawn mower is important
to me and has significance and value to me in the mode of being a responsible home owner.
Therefore, I am encountered in taking care as that ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ the work is done. “The
for-the-sake-of-which always concerns the being of Dasein which is essentially concerned about
this being itself in its being” (Heidegger, 2010, p.83).
The fact that the totality of relevance is structured for the sake of Dasein means that this
totality must also be intelligible or make sense to Dasein. In order to take care of the shed, Dasein
must ‘signify’ all of the necessary referential relations to itself. Heidegger writes “the for-thesake-of-which signifies an in-order-to, the in-order-to signifies a what-for, the what-for signifies a
what-in of letting something be relevant, and the latter a what-with of relevance. These relations
are interlocked among themselves as a primordial totality” (Heidegger, 2010, p.85). All of the
relations between Dasein and useful things are significant for Dasein and relate to one another
intelligibly by means of this signification. “We shall call this relational totality of signification
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significance” (Heidegger, 2010, p.85). Dasein is the only being that has significance and gives
value to relevant relations. Together with the totality of relevance, the totality of significance
constitutes the worldliness of the world, which is the intelligible network of relations of value and
function that make taking care possible (i.e. make Dasein’s being possible): “Innerworldly beings
in general are projected upon the world, that is, upon a totality of significance in whose referential
relations taking care, as being-in-the-world, has rooted itself from the beginning” (Heidegger,
2010, p.146).
Dasein encounters more than itself and useful things in the world; it also encounters other
Dasein (Heidegger, 2010, p.115). Because Dasein is in the world with other Dasein, its mode of
being is characterized by Heidegger as ‘being-with.’ This ‘being-with’ has nothing to do with
being physically close to others; rather it is a mode of being of Dasein, and a structural
component of its being that is shared with others. In steadfastly avoiding the subject-object
distinctions of the metaphysics of presence, Heidegger cannot make the claim that there is a self –
understood as a self-identifying and transcendental ‘I’ – that is distinct from the community at
large (other Dasein). This would oppose the self (subject) to the community (objects). “The
positive interpretation of Dasein that has been given up to now already forbids a point of
departure from the formal givenness of the I if the intention is to find a phenomenally adequate
answer to the question of who” (Heidegger, 2010, p.113). Instead of this I, Heidegger’s answer to
the question of ‘who’ is the larger community of other Daseins. For Heidegger, therefore there is
nothing of Dasein that is not a particularization of the larger community of others. The effects of
the community on Dasein’s being can be seen in the language that Dasien speaks, its clothing,
what it eats, and etcetera. Culture and community can be identified and recognized in virtually
every aspect of Dasein’s mode of being. Others are therefore not people that are different from
me, but those in whom I see myself. “‘Others’ does not mean everybody else but me – those from
whom the I distinguishes itself. Others are, rather, those from whom one mostly does not
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distinguish oneself, those among whom one also is” (Heidegger, 2010, p.115). In this way,
Dasein’s being is being-with.
Where Dasein encounters useful things in taking care, it encounters other Dasein in what
Heidegger calls ‘concern.’ (Heidegger, 2010, p.118). Heidegger discusses two kinds of concern.
On the one hand there is ‘leaping in,’ where others do for Dasein what it can do for itself. When
others leap in for us, they remove some of the responsibility of existence by taking care of the
things that we should take care of ourselves. In other words, we allow others to determine our
being for us, which is ultimately our responsibility. “In this concern, the other can become
someone who is dependent and dominated even if this domination is a tactic one and remains
hidden from him” (Heidegger, 2010, p.119). On the other hand, if others ‘leap-ahead,’ they
demonstrate to Dasein its potential to be responsible for itself. Heidegger writes, “there is the
possibility of a concern which does not so much leap in for the other as leap ahead of him in his
existentiell potentiality-of-being, not in order to take ‘care’ away from him, but rather to
authentically give it back as such” (Heidegger, 2010, p.119). Leaping-ahead is an authentic
relation that helps to free others to be authentic, whereas ‘leaping-in’ takes away Dasein’s being
(care) by taking care of things that are its responsibility.
Being-with is the social dimension of worldliness; this social dimension sheds further
light on the way that Dasein’s being is determined by being-with: “The structure of the
worldliness of the world is such that others are not initially present as unattached subjects along
with other things, but show themselves in their heedful being in the surrounding world in terms of
the things at hand in that world” (Heidegger, 2010, p.120). We can grasp the social worldliness of
being-with if we return to the example of building a shed. In order to build that shed, I must go to
Home Depot and buy the building materials, and building tools, like hammers, nails, and etcetera.
So the shed itself – as well as my being a carpenter for that matter – depend on other people
working at Home Depot to stock these products and have them available to me: “The others who
are ‘encountered’ in the context of useful things in the surrounding world at hand are not
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somehow added on in thought to an initially merely objectively present thing, but these ‘things’
are encountered from the world in which they are at hand for the others” (Heidegger, 2010,
p.115). Dasein exists for others and others exist for Dasein. In taking care together, Dasein relies
on other Dasein and it cares for-the-sake-of-other Dasein. Therefore, the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’
that structures the totality of relevance is more or less a ‘for-the-sake-of-others.’ In other words,
taking care and concern are intertwined: “As being-with, Dasein ‘is’ essentially for the sake of
others. This must be understood as an existential statement as to its essence” (Heidegger, 2010,
p.120).
Once my own shed is built, I can show concern about my neighbour and leap in to build
him a shed, since he must also protect his lawn mower from the elements in the mode of being a
fellow responsible home owner. By the same token, I can leap-ahead and we can build the shed
together. Either way, the shed is something that is significant to both Dasein and Dasein’s
neighbour in the mode of being a responsible home owner that they share. We can see that Dasein
shares an understanding of the world of relevance and significance with other Daseins: “The
previously constituted disclosedness of others together with being-with thus helps to constitute
significance, that is, worldliness” (Heidegger, 2010, p.120). This shared understanding is a shared
being of Dasein, since what is taken care of is more or less significant and intelligible in the same
way for Dasein as it is for others. Because of this, it will be understood in a similar way: “The
relation of being to others then becomes a projection of one’s own being toward oneself ‘into an
other.’ The other is a duplicate of the self” (Heidegger, 2010, p.121). We can see here for
Heidegger the extent to which we are more or less particularizations of our social world or
community understanding and the way that Dasein necessarily shares meaning and value in
common with other Dasein.
However, when Dasein is absorbed in the world as a particularization of the community,
it is not technically itself according to Heidegger: “In being absorbed in the world of taking care
of things, that is, at the same time in being-with toward others, Dasein is not itself” (Heidegger,
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2010, p.122). For Heidegger, this absorption initially and for the most part causes Dasein to limit
its potential to take care of things and be responsible for that which one ought to be responsible
for. So instead of being responsible for itself and leaping ahead, Dasein is inauthentic initially and
for the most part, allowing others to leap in for it. “The various possibilities of being of Dasein
themselves mislead and obstruct being-with-one-another and its self-knowledge, so that a genuine
‘understanding’ is suppressed and Dasein takes refuge in surrogates” (Heidegger, 2010, p.122).
What Heidegger calls ‘averageness’ is the way of life prescribed by the ‘they’ (the
nebulous group of others) and the condition of limitation of Dasein’s being. The being of the they
is what Heidegger calls ‘publicness.’ This is the common or everyday mode of being of Dasein.
This averageness is a mode of being that avoids the responsibility to be oneself and to leap ahead,
and can be characterized as conformity and inauthenticity. He writes,
In utilizing public transportation, in the use of information services such as the
newspaper, every other is like the next. This being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own
Dasein completely into the kind of being of ‘the others’ in such a way that the others, as
distinguishable and explicit, disappear more and more. In this inconspicuousness and
unascertainablity, the they unfolds its true dictatorship. We enjoy ourselves and have fun
the way they enjoy themselves. We read, see, and judge literature and art the way they see
and judge. But we also withdraw from the ‘great mass’ the way they withdraw, we find
‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The they, which is nothing definite and which all are,
though not as a sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness
(Heidegger, 2010, p.122).
If we rely on news pundits in the mass media to form our opinions on various political matters,
we not only avoid the responsibility of forming our own opinions and thinking for ourselves, but
we also end up with the same common or average opinion as all the others that form their opinion
in the same way: “The they is everywhere, but in such a way that it has always already stolen
away when Dasein presses for a decision. However, because the they presents every judgement
and decision as its own, it takes the responsibility of Dasein away from it” (Heidegger, 2010,
p.124). For Heidegger, in this average condition Dasein is ‘leveled down’ to the lowest common
denominator so that “the self of one’s own Dasein and the self of the other have neither found nor
lost themselves. One is in the manner of dependency and inauthenticity” (Heidegger, 2010,
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p.124). In this condition Dasein does not take responsibility for its own being. However, Dasein
is ultimately responsible for its being. When ‘they’ assume responsibility for Dasein’s being, “the
they disburdens Dasein in its everydayness” (Heidegger, 2010, p.124) when Dasein allows the
they to leap in. It does this by making things easy for it, which then further entrenches Dasein in
the easy common sense inauthenticity of the they. When Dasein is in this average mode of being,
it allows others to set limits to its being.
This self that is dependent on the they is what Heidegger calls the ‘they-self;’ the theyself is juxtaposed to the ‘authentic self.’ (Heidegger, 2010, p.125). The they-self is constituted by
an understanding of the world that limits Dasein’s being: “If Dasein is familiar with itself as the
they-self, this also means that the they prescribes the nearest interpretation of the world and of
being-in-the-world. The they itself, for the sake of which Dasein is every day, articulates the
referential context of significance.” (Heidegger, 2010, p.125). This prescription limits Dasein’s
being by making it average via the way that the world is made intelligible to Dasein. As discussed
above, this intelligibility is necessary for Dasein to exist in its various modes of being. The world
must be intelligible for Dasein in order for Dasein to take care of things in it. The they limit
Dasein’s being (i.e. care), via the way that the worldliness of the world is disclosed to Dasein:
“The world of Dasein frees the beings encountered for a totality of relevance which is familiar to
the they in the limits which are established with the averageness of the they” (Heidegger, 2010,
p.125). The alternative is the authentic self, which is not limited by the interpretations of the
world prescribed by the they, and therefore sees the world as it is.
We can see here that, although being-with is a necessary aspect of being-in-the-world, the
average or everydayness of this being-with nevertheless sets limits to Dasein’s potential being in
undesirable ways. This brings us to the problem of the possibility of removing these limits while
remaining a part of the community that set or prescribed them. Heidegger’s solution to this
problem is authenticity. It is assumed that the authentic self is a modification of Dasein’s
everyday mode of being that allows Dasein to see the world as it is by freeing Dasein from the
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inauthentic understanding prescribed by the ‘they.’ It is important to keep in mind that beingwith is not the source of inauthenticity such that being authentic means removing oneself
somehow from the community: “Authentic being a self is not based on an exceptional state of the
subject, detached from the they” (Heidegger, 2010, p.126). Authenticity is rather a modification
of Dasein’s everyday being-with others so that one’s existence is the community with others is
chosen rather than prescribed. By choosing itself rather than allowing itself to be prescribed,
Dasein takes responsibility for itself and is supposed to shed the limitations of the they-self. In
fact, for Heidegger, there are indeed forms of authentic community, which are different from the
average everydayness described above. Heidegger describes an “authentic alliance” where
“being-with-one-another is based initially and often exclusively on what is taken care of together”
(Heidegger, 2010, p.119). This seems similar to the example I gave above regarding carpenters
and their relation to Home Depot. In taking care of things that Daseins find meaningful and
valuable in common, Dasein’s being-with does not limit its being, in fact, it facilitates its
actualization. Inauthenticity is found when the ‘they’ limit Dasein’s being through the average
levelled down way of understanding the world that Dasein adopts for itself when it allows others
to leap in and take the responsibility of taking care away from it. Authenticity then is a way of
being with others in which Dasein chooses to take responsibility for itself and take care of itself.
In order to better understand the way that they limit Dasein’s being, and how authenticity
modifies this being in order to overcome these limitations, I will need to discuss Heidegger’s
concept of ‘disclosure.’ This discussion will also provide an account of Heidegger’s concept of
understanding, which I argue is modified by Gadamer.
According to Wheeler, ‘Dasein’ can be translated into English as both ‘there being’ and
‘open being.’ For Heidegger, “the being which is essentially constituted by being-in-the-world is
itself always its ‘there’” (Heidegger, 2010, p.129). This openness to the ‘there’ is what Heidegger
calls ‘disclosedness.’ Disclosed literally means opened. What is disclosed to Dasein is its’ there
(the phenomenon of being-in-the-world), which is more or less the totality of existence. He
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writes, “Dasein exists, and it alone. Thus existence is standing out, into and enduring, the
openness of the there” (Heidegger, 2010, p.129).3 This disclosure is an opening that allows for the
‘illumination’ of understanding, which frees beings to be what they are within this opening or
clearing, thereby allowing for the projection of Dasein’s various modes of being. In saying that
Dasein is illuminated, Heidegger means “that it is cleared in itself as being-in-the-world, not by
another being, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing [Lichtung]. Only for a being thus
cleared existentially do objectively present things become accessible in the light or concealed in
darkness” (Hiedegger, 2010, p.129). This clearing, which allows for the world to be illuminated,
is the very being of Dasein; “Dasein is its disclosedness” (Heidegger, 2010, p.129). This is why
Wheeler refers to disclosure as care. This openness or disclosure can be authentic or inauthentic.
There are three dimensions of disclosure: thrownness, projection and fallen-ness (Wheeler, 2016).
Authenticity is a modification of this structure of disclosure into thrown-projection.
Dasein’s thrownness is disclosed in attunement, which is characterized by Heidegger in
terms of Dasein’s mood. This mood for Heidegger is not something that is purely subjective, but
is rather like the atmosphere within which aspects of the there are disclosed to Dasein, or Dasein
is “brought before its being as the there” (Heidegger, 2010, p.131). When Dasein is in a good
mood, what is disclosed is light and easy going. In a bad mood, Dasein is disclosed as something
burdensome: “Mood makes manifest ‘how one is and is coming along.’ In this ‘how one is’ being
in a mood brings being to its ‘there’” (Heidegger, 2010, p.131).
Dasein is ‘delivered over’ to its there in attunement, meaning that it has no choice in the
matter. The way that Dasein is delivered over to its there is characterized as ‘thrownness.’ Dasein
is thrown into the being of its there; “it is thrown in such a way that it is the there as being-in-theworld.” (Heidegger, 2010, p.131). The there that Dasein is thrown into is submitted to and it
assails Dasein. In this way, attunement discloses Dasein’s ‘disposedness’ to the there that Dasein
is thrown into. That it is delivered over and disposed means that what is disclosed in attunement
3

This quote is found in the footnote section of p.129.
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is determined outside of Dasein’s control; this is similar to the way that the trajectory of a rock
that I throw is determined outside of the control of the rock. This does not mean that it is outside
of Dasein, just outside of its control like height, hair color, place and date of birth, and etcetera;
these are finite facts of Dasein’s being; these facts can only be objectively present to Dasein that
is thrown into the ‘facticity’ of its existence that ontologically presupposes these facts: “Facticity
is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something objectively present, but is a characteristic
of the being of Dasein” (Heidegger, 2010, p.132). What is disclosed in attunement is
characterized by Heidegger as “that it is and has to be” (Heidegger, 2010, p.132). Because I am
attunened to the world, I am disposed to the facts of the situation (i.e. the ‘facticity’ of my
existence): “The expression thrownness is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered
over.” (Heidegger, 2010, p.131-132). This thrownness is an important part of Dasein’s finitude.
Dasein is a finite being with finite limitations imposed by the there that Dasein is thrown into.
What matters or what is significant to Dasein (what Dasein will inevitably care about) is
also disclosed in attunement: “In attunement lies existentially a disclosive submission to world
out of which things that matter to us can be encountered” (Heidegger, 2010, p.134). Heidegger
discusses fear as a mood to demonstrate the way that what matters to Dasein is disclosed in
attunement. With fear, we are afraid that something will happen to damage us or someone else
will be damaged. For example, a carpenter working on the roof of a shed may suddenly realize
that he or she is not at a safe distance to the ground and become afraid of injury due to falling.
One’s mood throws one out of the circumspection of building a shed in the mode of being a
carpenter, and into the fear of falling. That the shed built by Dasein in the mode of being a
carpenter is encountered in a circumspect way therefore also depends on Dasein’s attunement. In
this mood shift, certain aspects of life lose significance while others gain it. In this way, what
matters is disclosed in attunement.
The way that Dasein is brought before its there is described as an ‘evasion’ and ‘turning
away:’ “Attunement discloses Dasein in its thrownness and, initially and for the most part, in the
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mode of an evasive turning away” (Heidegger, 2010, p.132-133). Dasein feels the responsibility
to be what it is, which is a being that cares. This responsibility might be burdensome, so Dasein
will look away from itself in order to find itself; it will look to make or create itself
inauthenticially by allowing others to leap in for it and prescribe its existence rather than
choosing it. As discussed above, absorption into the world and the common sense of the ‘they’ is
the way that Dasein is initially and for the most part in its everydayness: “Dasein is continually
surrendered to the ‘world’ and lets itself be concerned by it in such a way that it, in a certain
sense evades itself. The existential constitution of this evasion becomes clear in the phenomenon
of entanglement” (Heidegger, 2010, p.135). In entanglement, we end up evading responsibility
(i.e. turning away from ourselves) and become caught up in the world and the publicness of the
they through ‘idle talk,’ ‘curiosity’ and ‘ambiguity.’ These things distort beings and cover them
over with the common sense interpretation of the they.
In order to further investigate this problem of Heidegger’s distinction between
authenticity and inauthenticity, I will discuss the second way that the ‘there’ is disclosed to
Dasein: understanding. For Heidegger, understanding cannot be thought of in the traditional way
because this way presupposes the metaphysics of presence. Traditionally, understanding was seen
as a faculty of the mind that produces concepts that allow us to know things about the world. For
Kant, knowledge is acquired through judgments that consist in attaching subjects to predicates.
For example, I understand the concept of hammer as a tool that is hard and heavy and good for
hammering things. ‘Hard,’ ‘heavy’ and ‘good for hammering things’ are predicates, which I
attach to the subject ‘hammer’ using the faculty of my judgment. As opposed to producing
abstract concepts, the understanding for Heidegger is seen as a mode of being of Dasein that lets
beings ‘show’ themselves freely as they are in themselves. Understanding is being [Sein] in the
sense that it is what allows beings to be what they are.
For Heidegger, understanding is practical. “We sometimes use the expression ‘to
understand something’ to mean ‘being able to handle it,’ ‘being able to do something’”
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(Heidegger, 2010, p.139). The understanding provides a clearing whereby beings are free to be
what they are in themselves. In other words, it allows beings to reveal themselves in terms of
what we can do with them practicality, which is their handiness or their being. In so doing, we are
able to use the tools for our practical ends of care and concern or to do the things that matter to
us.
Heidegger characterizes the understanding as the ‘sight’ of Dasein, because of the way
that it discloses or brings into the light certain practical aspects of the world such as handiness,
relevance and significance. Our encounters with useful or handy things would be merely
objectively present (having only the ontological status of an object) if not for the disclosure of the
sight of the understanding. Heidegger writes that the sight of the understanding “contains in itself
the explicitness of referential relations (of the in-order-to) which belong to the totality of
relevance in terms of which what is simply encountered is understood” (Heidegger, 2010, p.144145). Think about, for example, how strange a hammer would look if you did not know what it
was. For you, the hammer would be just metal and wood (the raw facticity of the situation); in
other words, it would be ‘objectively present’ (having the ontological status of a thing or an
innerworldly being) but it would not reveal itself in its being (handiness). While this example
does not represent a possibility for Heidegger (since both being and objective presence of a thing
are disclosed simultaneously), it serves to illustrate the importance of human understanding for
the worldliness of the world. Without seeing the handiness of the hammer, and the other
referential relations that are significant to Dasein in the mode of being a carpenter, what is
encountered and at hand is not understood within the totality of relevance and significance that
Dasein relies on for the meaningful activity that produces itself and thereby constitutes its very
being. Therefore, in understanding, “not only is the world, qua world, disclosed in its possible
significance, but innerworldly beings themselves are freed, freed for their own possibility”
(Heidegger, 2010, p.140). Understanding the hammer means that the hammer is brought into the
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light (so to speak) where it is free to reveal itself to Dasein as what it really is (its possibility) via
Dasein’s use of the hammer in taking care.
Understanding is importantly characterized by Heidegger as a ‘projection.’ Wheeler
remarks that projection represents an ontological surplus in Dasein, which allows it to ‘leap
ahead’ of itself and be more than it is. Heidegger writes, “because of the kind of being which is
constituted by the existential of projecting, Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than it actually is”
(Heidegger, 2010, p.141). To project is to bring forth Dasein’s being. One does not just pick up a
hammer to become a carpenter; it takes years of practice to bring forth this mode of being.
However, even before Dasein is in the mode of being a carpenter, it has the potential to be a
carpenter. It always has the potential to be more than it is. In the activity of project and care, we
actualize that potential and become more than what we are.
As was touched on above, this project is necessarily limited by one’s ‘facticity,’ which is
disclosed in attunement. We are thrown into a world that presents a more or less limited range of
possibilities upon which Dasein can project its being. An important aspect of this thrownness is
the worldliness of the world that we are thrown into. The understanding is the potential to project
one’s being and to actualize these possibilities. Attunement determines the range of possibilities
that the understanding can actualize. This is why authentic Dasein is described by Heidegger as
‘thrown possibility,’ or thrown-projection. Heidegger writes,
As essentially attuned, Dasein has always already got itself into definite possibilities. As
a potentiality for being which it is, it has let some go by; it constantly adopts the
possibilities of its being, grasps them, and sometimes fails to grasp them. But this means
that Dasein is a being-possible which is entrusted to itself, it is thrown possibility
throughout.
(Heidegger, 2010, p.139).
We are attuned to certain possibilities that we are thrown into, and we actualize these possibilities
in the practicality of taking care thanks to the sight of the understanding: “In the mode of ‘being
attuned’ Dasein ‘sees’ possibilities in terms of which it is. In the projective disclosure of such
possibilities, it is always already attuned. The project of its ownmost potentiality of being is
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delivered over to the fact of thrownness into the there” (Heidegger, 2010, p.143). Dasein’s being
is necessarily limited by the possibilities that it is thrown into. The projection of the
understanding actualizes these possibilities.
The understanding develops explicitly in interpretation, which can be understood as
understanding in action. Interpretation makes understanding explicit in terms of the ‘as’ structure
of understanding. For Kant, ‘as’ was used to connect subjects like ‘hammer’ to predicates like
‘heavy’ in order to facilitate understanding (i.e. the hammer is understood as heavy). However,
for Heidegger, the ‘as’ structure functions to let beings show themselves ‘as’ what they are:
“What is disclosed in understanding, what is understood, is always already accessible in such a
way that in it, its ‘as what’ can be explicitly delineated. The ‘as’ constitutes the structure of the
explicitness of what is understood; it constitutes the interpretation” (Heidegger, 2010, p.144). For
example, the hammer is understood ‘as’ its handiness when it is used or freed in the mode of
being a carpenter. The explicit handiness of the hammer is the way that understanding develops
from ambiguous understanding into explicit understanding.
Interpretation is already in place before things are revealed, and the way that the world is
revealed to us or freed within the open space of the understanding depends on this interpretation.
This is what Heidegger calls the ‘fore-structure’ of interpretation. This perspective within which
we judge is the worldliness of the world that Dasein is thrown into. It is based on what Heidegger
calls ‘fore-having,’ since it exists prior to the understanding and the interpretation that grasps it
explicitly: “As the appropriation of understanding in being [Sein] that understands, the
interpretation operates in being toward a totality of relevance which has already been understood”
(Heidegger, 2010, p.145). Because of this fore-structure, interpretation is a circle, and one will
always understand things in the way that is set up and structured in advance (the structure of the
worldliness of the world) of the act of interpretation.4 This hermeneutic circle is not to be avoided

This idea of one’s understanding being determined before the act of understanding is similar to what
Gadamer calls prejudice.
4
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by splitting the world into a subjective observer and the objective observable world. “What is
decisive is not to get out of the circle, but to get into it in the right way” (Heidegger, 2010, p.148).
We “get into” the hermeneutic circle by projecting the meaning of the whole on the basis of our
understanding of a part. We must keep this partial interpretation open to revision. The “circle” is
the expanding scope of understanding produce by on-going revision of partial interpretations.
However, this proper way to get into the circle is only grasped in a genuine way “when
interpretation has understood that its first, constant, and last task is not to let ‘fore-having,’ ‘foresight,’ and ‘fore-conception’ be given to it by chance ideas and popular conceptions” (Heidegger,
2010, p.148). To interpret the world in advance based on chance ideas and popular conceptions
would be inauthentic, since these chance ideas are not chosen but prescribed.
The third aspect of the structure of disclosure is ‘falling prey.’ This aspect of disclosure is
the result of turning away from oneself and becoming entangled in the world. For Heidegger,
understanding and interpretation can be either authentic or inauthentic. One can either understand
oneself in terms of the world, or one can understand oneself in terms of Dasein, the ‘for-the-sakeof-which’ of the world: “Understanding can turn primarily to the disclosedness of the world, that
is, Dasein can understand itself initially and for the most part in terms of the world. Or else
understanding throws itself primarily into the for-the-sake-of-which, which means Dasein exists
as itself” (Heidegger, 2010, p.141). While thrownness represents necessary limitations, Dasein is
also initially and for the most part subject to the unnecessary limitations imposed by the they.
These unnecessary limitations are characterized by Heidegger as ‘entanglement’ and ‘falling
prey.’ The they have a specific way of understanding and interpreting the world; this way
produces the everyday and average mode of being in the world. In order to maintain this
inauthentic mode of being in the world, we must turn away from ourselves; when we turn away
from ourselves we have already fallen prey to the they and become entangled in the world; for
Heidegger, inauthenticity “constitutes precisely a distinctive kind of being-in-the-world which is
completely taken in by the world and the Dasein-with of the others in the they” (Heidegger, 2010,
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p.169). Based on this reading of Heidegger, it seems that one has to be in the world in such a way
that one is not outside the world, but neither is one completely absorbed in the world. If we spend
too much time entangled in the world, we become average and just like all the others: “The
understanding of Dasein in the they thus constantly goes astray in its projects with regard to the
genuine possibilities of being” (Heidegger, 2010, p.168). When it goes astray, it does not interpret
the world in a way that would allow Dasein to live up to its potential of being; in other words, it
puts limits on Dasein’s potential to care and project its being by covering over or obfuscating
being.
As I have tried to reiterate, inauthenticity is how all Daseins initially begin and how they
are for the most part. In order to break free of entanglement and project our being in an authentic
way, Dasein must go through an existential crisis that consists of several steps, which I will
quickly go over. First of all, Dasein – absorbed in the they – must experience ‘anxiety.’ Anxiety
is a mode of attunement in which Dasein is thrown into the world wherein the common sense
interpretation of the they no longer discloses any meaning or intelligibility. In this anxiety, one is
able to disclose to oneself an understanding of death as the existential limit of Dasein’s
possibility. Death is the necessary limit of possibility and projection. Death is the one thing that
no other Dasein can leap in and take care of for Dasein; one’s death is one’s own. In anticipating
this limitation, Dasein is able to understand something that is personal and necessary. Dasein’s
experience of death is the way that it grasps its finitude. This finitude is understood in a very
personal way as the resolute anticipation of one’s inevitable death (one’s ownmost possibility of
being).
When one experiences anxiety and anticipates death in this way, one is able to hear the
call of conscience. To hear the call of conscience, Dasein has to be attuned to listening to itself
and not the they. At this point, Dasein begins to turn away from the world and the they, and
toward itself. The call of conscience allows Dasein to recognize its lostness in the they and the
way that this lostness unnecessarily limits its being by making it average: “The call introduces the
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fact of constantly being-guilty and thus brings the self back from the loud idle chatter of the
they’s common sense” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 283). The call reveals to Dasein that it is guilty of
limiting its being by allowing itself to become entangled in the world and fall prey to the they.
The way that the they limit Dasein’s being makes it irresponsible. It is guilty therefore of being
irresponsible.
When Dasein decides that it will be responsible, and no longer wants to be lost in the
they, it is resolute. Heidegger writes, “resoluteness brings the self right into its being together
with things at hand, actually taking care of them” (Heidegger, 2010, P.285). Resolute is how
Dasein is when it is authentic and therefore free from entanglement to project according to its
own potentiality of being within the finite limitations of its thrownness. In other words, Dasein,
no longer limited by the they interpretation, is able to project its being (i.e. take care) properly
and authentically.
However, it is unclear how the anticipation of death would make a difference in Dasein’s
everyday existence. Authenticity is a modification of Dasein’s being that affects the motivation
for action, but not necessarily the content of action. If – for example – Dasein is a Christian as
opposed to an atheist that anticipates its death resolutely, Dasein still takes care of things in the
world in relatively the same way; i.e. the content of their actions are the same. A Christian Dasein
still raises children, goes to work, takes out the garbage, loves his wife, builds a shed, cuts the
lawn, and etcetera. The reason why is because these are things that authentic Dasein has in
common with inauthentic Christian Dasein. They are things that they both care about and that
matter to both of them. It is again unclear how the anticipation of death makes any sort of
meaningful difference in Dasein’s potential to take care and project its being; this is the case
despite Heidegger’s insistence that the call of conscience is the call to care. He writes:
Conscience reveals itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, anxious in thrownness
(in its already-being-in…) about its potentiality-of-being. The one summoned is also
Dasein, called forth to its ownmost potentiality-of-being (in its already-ahead of itself…).
And what is called by the summons – out of falling prey to the they (already-being-
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together-with-the-world-taken-care-of) – is Dasein. The call of conscience, that is,
conscience itself, has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the ground of its
being, is care
(Heidegger, 2010, p.267).
Does this call to care, which can only be heard by authentically attuned Dasein, indicate that
inauthentic Dasein does not care to the fullest of its being? The Christian Dasein and the atheist
Dasein may have different motivations for their actions, but the content of their actions is not
necessarily affected by modifying Dasein’s disclosure with the resolute anticipation of death.
That one is authentic and one is not is only a meaningful distinction to the one who has
experienced the resolute anticipation of death. From the outside observer (to the community of
Daseins), since the content of authentic Dasein’s actions are more or less the same as the content
of inauthenitic Dasein’s, the distinction is meaningless.
We can see the same meaningless distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity if
we re-examine the example of Home Depot presented above. Although the Home Depot example
is of an authentic community, all of the various carpenters and Home Depot staff can easily be
inauthentic (behaving in prescribed rather than chosen ways) and the scenario would play out the
same way. Individuals make choices everyday and take care of things in common everyday,
whether they are authentically chosen or inauthentically prescribed. Heidegger claims that
inauthenticity limits Dasein’s being by allowing others to take care away. However, it is unclear
how this limitations translates into the everyday activity of taking care that constitutes Dasein’s
being-in-the-world.
As I touched on early in this chapter, Dasein – as being-in-the-world – is a unified whole
of Dasein and world. This is something that Heidegger makes very clear and which serves as the
basis of his critique of the metaphysics of presence. However, despite this insistence, Heidegger
still describes Dasein as something that turns toward the world to be inauthentic and away from
the world and toward itself when it is authentic. In turning toward itself, Dasein is turning away
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from the community and the they interpretation that covers over its being, which on a certain
level is impossible due to the fact that Dasein’s thrownness and Dasein’s being-with are
inescapable components of its existence. As discussed above, Dasein is always a particularization
of the larger community. I do not think that it can turn away from those that prescribe its being in
order to choose its being for itself when Dasein’s being is necessarily determined by the historical
and cultural meaning and value systems that it was thrown into. Thrownness assails Dasein and it
is outside of its control. Part of this thrownness is a particular worldliness of the world that
Dasein relies on for the meaningful engagement with the world that brings forth its being. So
thrownness must be a level of social and cultural tradition that necessarily prescribes Dasein’s
being. Authenticity would then be grasping the level of social and cultural tradition that is
necessary for Dasein’s existence to have any meaning, and dismissing the aspects of the they
interpretation that limit its existence. However, it is unclear how turning away from the world and
toward oneself (a self that is necessarily conditioned by the social and cultural meaning systems
that it was thrown into) will free Dasein from the social and cultural meaning systems that limit it
and make it inauthentic.
Heidegger thinks that turning toward oneself means that Dasein can hear the call of
conscience; this is only possible if Dasein cannot hear the common sense of the they, which it
will not hear if it has turned away from the community and toward itself. When anxiety discloses
a meaningless and unintelligible world, Dasein must find something else to make its being
intelligible. This something else must be Dasein itself. To the extent that the structure of
significance based on Dasein itself is incongruous with the common sense of the they,
authenticity cannot be recognized by the community. It cannot be recognized by the community
because whatever it is that makes authenticity intelligible to Dasein (the call of conscience)
cannot be shared with the community. Considering what Heidegger says about being-with and
thrownness, authenticity must mean responsible community membership and authentic Dasein
must share significance with other Dasein in the community. However, given what Heidegger
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says about taking responsibility for oneself as someone distinct from the they – and the way that
taking responsibility for oneself involves Dasin being cut off from the meaning that it shares with
others – this idea of authenticity as responsible community membership is incoherent.
In general, authenticity is a relation to the self in which one is true to oneself. For Charles
Taylor in The Ethics of Authenticity,5 one does not turn away from the community in order to be
true to oneself. Rather, one’s authentic identity must develop through community interaction. For
Heidegger, with the resolute anticipation of death, one is ‘born again’ authentically and the ‘theyself’ is overcome and replaced by the authentic self. Because this transformation is so personal,
Heidegger cuts the individual off from the community in a way that makes it impossible for the
community to recognize what it is to be authentic. Taylor writes, “the genesis of the human mind
is in this sense not ‘monological,’ not something each accomplishes on his or her own, but
dialogical” (Taylor, 1999, p.33). In Heidegger, we do not find a dialogical genesis of authenticity.
It is instead monological, since it involves looking inward and understanding or grasping death as
something that is deeply personal, which nobody can leap in and take care of for you. Taylor
writes, “we become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining
an identity through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression” (Taylor, 1999, p.33).
Through these rich human languages of expression, we are able to authentically express ourselves
and develop our authentic identity through our various community interactions: “My discovering
my identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation but that I negotiate it through dialogue,
partly overt, partly internalized, with others” (Taylor, 1999, p.46).Through these discursive
community interactions, one’s identity can be recognized as authentic and meaningful.’
Following Taylor, I argue that without this recognition by the community, authentic
identity has no meaning. For example, former NAACP president Rachel Dolezal is predominantly
of European descent. Nevertheless, she identifies as black. However, the black community failed

While Taylor does not mention Heidegger or Gadamer, his discussion of authenticity – and its
development in the recognition of others – is the basis for my critique of Heidegger.
5
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to recognize her as a black person; because she is not recognized as black, her identity is
inauthentic and has no meaning. Taylor writes, “the thing about inwardly derived, personal,
original identity is that it doesn’t enjoy this recognition a priori. It has to win it through exchange,
and it can fail” (Taylor, 1999, p.48). While Dolezal’s struggle to be recognized as black failed,
many do not. Olympic gold medalist in the 1976 men’s decathlon Caitlyn Jenner was thrown into
a man’s body but nevertheless identifies as a woman. Unlike Dolezal, the community recognizes
Jenner’s identity and she is able to live her life as a woman. Therefore, her identity is authentic
and has meaning within the community that recognizes it.
For Taylor therefore, authenticity requires agreed upon rules and values for what is
legitimate and recognizable; Taylor claims that without this common set of criteria, identity
recognition descends into cultural relativism in which all idiosyncratic features of identity are
accepted as legitimate. “There must be some substantive agreement on value, or else the formal
principle of equality will be empty and a sham…Recognizing difference, like self-choosing,
requires a horizon of significance, in this case a shared one” (Taylor, 1999, p.52). In other words,
there are agreed upon standards for what can be recognized as authentic. ‘Black’ and ‘woman’ are
examples of meaningful categories that we can choose to identify with; this identity must be
recognized as such for this identity to obtain authenticity. Important to keep in mind is that these
community criteria are not totally based on one’s genetic heritage or chromosomal configuration.
It would be disingenuous to say that Caitlyn Jenner is biologically a woman but Rachel Dolezal is
not descendent from Africa. These categories must be at least in some part social constructs.
These social constructs are some of the shared meanings that we use to make sense of the world
and ourselves. They are part of our community horizon of intelligibility that we must necessarily
use to form our identity. “It follows that one of the things we can’t do, if we are to define
ourselves significantly, is suppress or deny the horizons against which things take on significance
for us” (Taylor, 1999, p.37). Just like Heidegger, Taylor understands that we share
interpretations and significance with others and we cannot define ourselves in any meaningful
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way outside of a shared horizon of meaning that has value to the community. We need a
meaningful horizon of things that matter in order to define ourselves in a non-trivial fashion.
In the second chapter I will discuss how Gadamer’s concept of understanding as ‘fusing
horizons’ provides a more comprehensive account of understanding and authentic identity
formation. Gadamer’s account is more comprehensive than Heidegger’s because it demonstrates
and develops the role of the necessary recognition of others and by others in the constitution of
genuine or authentic identity as well as the way that authenticity might modify the content of our
actions.
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CHAPTER TWO
I have argued that Heidegger’s account of the distinction between authenticity and
inauthenticity is self-undermining because it cannot distinguish between the two opposed
dispositions. It cannot because it is a purely inward disposition; but authenticity, as Taylor
argued, is an identification that must be recognizable by the community. In the following chapter,
I will argue that Gadamer’s account of understanding as ‘fusing horizons’ further develops
Taylor’s idea that authenticity must be recognized by the community in order to be meaningful in
the life of the individual.
Gadamer’s concept of understanding that he develops in Truth and Method is borrowed
and modified from Heidegger’s account in Being and Time. As I discussed in the previous
chapter, Heidegger’s interpretation of understanding is that it is the clearing within which beings
are free to reveal themselves to Dasein as what are. However, what they are revealed as (the way
that we interpret them) is determined in advance by the fore-structure of understanding, which is
what Gadamer would call ‘prejudice.’ Prejudices means pre-judgement, i.e. the anticipation of the
meaning of the whole on the basis of interpretation of the parts. Gadamer stresses the importance
of Heidegger’s recognition that “all understanding inevitably involves some prejudices”
(Gadamer, 1986, p.239). On Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s account, understanding depends on the
necessary prejudices that Dasein was thrown into – specifically the historically and culturally
determined worldliness of the world that Dasein relies on to make sense of the world.
Horizons are always structured by language. Communication and meaning are
understood as a part/whole relation in which the totality of the parts make up the whole, and each
individual part only makes sense within the context of the whole. The fore-meanings that make
understanding possible are constituted as a part/whole relation in which particular things are
understood against a total background of intelligibility (what Heidegger would call the
‘worldliness of the world’). As I touched on in the previous chapter, a particular hammer is
understood in the context of the construction industry (the worldliness of the world), and the
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construction industry is composed of countless particular functional tools and materials that
compose the whole. We could also say that the hammer exists as a part of the language of the
construction industry that makes it intelligible. Just like particular letters in the alphabet, these
particulars are meaningless outside of the totality of letters, a totality which they themselves
compose. The movement of understanding is circular in this way, since what is understood as a
particular constitutes and is determined by the whole.

The anticipation of meaning in which the whole is envisaged becomes explicit
understanding in that the parts, that are determined by the whole, themselves also
determine this whole…Our task is to extend in concentric circles the unity of the
understood meaning. The harmony of all the details with the whole is the criterion
of correct understanding
(Gadamer, 1986, p.259).
If something is out of place or alien (i.e. if something does not make sense), we must struggle to
incorporate it into our horizon (unless we reject it as meaningless); so the struggle for genuine
understanding circles from part to whole until the part is incorporated meaningfully into the
whole.
Just like Heidegger, for Gadamer there are productive prejudices (one’s thrownnesss for
Heidegger) that are necessary for understanding, and there are arbitrary prejudices (one’s
entanglements for Heidegger) that limit understanding when we fail to notice or take account of
them. Describing Heidegger’s hermeneutical understanding, Gadamer writes “all correct
interpretation must be on guard against arbitrary fancies and the limitations imposed by
imperceptible habits of thought and direct its gaze ‘on the things themselves’” (Gadamer, 1986,
p.236). Genuine or authentic understanding on both accounts is grasping one’s productive
prejudices and dismissing those that inhibit understanding or cover the world over.6 When we are
free of the biases that inhibit understanding, we understand ourselves authentically (i.e. as beings

Although Gadamer does not use the term ‘authentic,’ it can be understood as the mode of being that
allows for beings to reveal themselves as they are understood within a finite historical or cultural tradition.
For Gadamer, authentic understanding is only possible via the fusion of horizons.
6
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that exist within a finite historical and cultural tradition that give our lives and the lives of others
meaning and value) and we can form an authentic identity based on this self-understanding.
While both Heidegger and Gadamer agree that arbitrary prejudices make one inauthentic,
they differ on the way that these prejudices are to be weeded out and dealt in order to make one
authentic. For Heidegger, one can only be authentic and free of entanglement if one anticipates
death resolutely. For Gadamer, prejudices are distinguished in the work of understanding itself
when we struggle to understand something new and foreign to our horizon; this forces us to adapt
our fore-meaning to suit the alien thing that we are trying to understand within the tradition that
we use to understand things. “The prejudices and fore-meanings in the mind of the interpreter are
not at his free disposal. He is not able to separate in advance the productive prejudices that make
understanding possible from the prejudices that hinder understanding and lead to
misunderstanding” (Gadamer, 1986, p.263). That they cannot be separated in advance means that
they must be separated out in the present, as we work to understand something that is difficult to
assimilate into our meaning structure. I suppose that the more something evades an interpretation,
the more the interpreter struggles to interpret it. In order to understand something difficult, we are
forced to deal with the prejudices that block understanding. Things that we already understand do
not provide the opportunity to struggle in order to fit these things into our horizon. This struggle
is described as a filtering process with a positive value for understanding. This process “not only
lets those prejudices that are of a particular and limited nature die away, but causes those that
bring about genuine understanding to emerge clearly as such” (Gadamer, 1986, p.266). Therefore,
working out our prejudices does not mean abandoning the community horizon that has given
one’s life meaning, rather “all that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other
person or text” (Gadamer, 1986, p.238). Everyone has a perspective that is rooted in their finite
and constantly changing tradition and culture; however, we must be open to questioning and
modifying our prejudices in order to identify the productive prejudices that have been passed
down by this tradition. In being open to tradition, we become open to ourselves as beings shaped
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and defined by that tradition; and we therefore understand ourselves in an authentic and
meaningful way. This kind of openness involves “the conscious assimilation of one’s own foremeanings and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text
may present itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against one’s own
fore-meanings” (Gadamer, 1986, p.238). When someone’s horizon is closed, their prejudices are
not questioned, they are unaware of their bias, and understanding is hindered. “It is the tyranny
of hidden prejudices that makes us deaf to the language that speaks to us in tradition” (Gadamer,
1986, p.239). Instead of the anticipation of death, authentic self-understanding for Gadamer is
achieved with an open attitude and a willingness to struggle with something that is difficult to
understand. In this struggle, we become open to ourselves and form an authentic identity rooted
in a finite, shared, historical tradition.
In order for authenticity to exist therefore, it must have something to work on. For
Gadamer, a difficult text from the past provides a good way to facilitate the process of openness
and interaction that produces authentic self-understanding. When we interpret a historical text, we
are engaging with a horizon from the past that may at first appear strange or alien to us in the
present. Accounting for this difference involves grasping the tradition that is shared between the
text and the interpreter. It involves questioning idiosyncratic prejudices to find the common
ground that will allow the text to speak for itself or reveal itself freely in an authentic or genuine
way. Accounting for these differences and understanding the text amounts to a fusion of horizons
between past and present. This not only allows the text to be understood in a genuine way, but
opens one up to oneself and the tradition that is shared between the text in order to understand
that this shared tradition gives meaning to the existence of both: “Time is no longer primarily a
gulf to be bridged, because it separates, but it is actually the supportive ground of a process in
which the present is rooted” (Gadamer, 1986, p.264). An encounter with a text from the past
stimulates the examination of our prejudices (just as our encounters with others). As we work
through the text and make sense of it, we may be forced to deal with prejudices that inhibit our
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understanding, while never doing away with those that facilitate it and therefore give authentic
meaning to our own lives and work.
In describing the proper mental attitude toward the text that will produce authenticity,
Gadamer makes a distinction between ‘historical consciousness’ and ‘effective historical
consciousness.’ Historical consciousness is the awareness of the difference between the horizon
of the text and the horizon of the present, and then trying to grasp the horizon of the text
objectively. Gadamer criticizes historical consciousness for being blind to the bias of objectivity
that it carries with it, making historical consciousness inauthentic understanding. Effective
historical consciousness is the awareness of the fact that we cannot totally do away with our
prejudices and must therefore find common cultural ground with a text in order to understand it.
“In the process of understanding, there takes place a real fusing of horizons, which means that as
the historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously removed. We described the conscious act
of this fusion as the task of effective-historical consciousness” (Gadamer, 1986, p.272-273). For
historical consciousness to become effective historical consciousness, it must “take account of its
own historicality. To stand within a tradition does not limit the freedom of knowledge but makes
it possible” (Gadamer, 1986, p.324). Effective historical consciousness is ‘effective’ in so far as it
furthers the common tradition of the interpreter and the text by keeping it alive and not treating it
as a dead scientific artifact. “In a tradition this process of fusion is continually going on, for there
old and new continually grow together to make something of living value, without either being
explicitly distinguished from the other” (Gadamer, 1986, p.273). One must take account of one’s
own experience and horizon in order to recognize what is common with the text. If one is not
open to experiencing the text in this way, one will not recognize the common features between
the text and the interpreter that give meaning to one’s life. “Someone who is open in this way to
tradition sees that the historical consciousness is not really open at all, but rather, if it reads its
texts ‘historically’ has always thoroughly smoothed them out beforehand, so that the criteria of
our own knowledge can never be put in question by tradition” (Gadamer, 1986, p.325). Effective
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historical consciousness on the other hand remains open to the claims encountered in the text. It
understands the text as a living source of meaning and tradition; this tradition defines both the
text and the interpreter and orients them both in the world; this tradition is not fixed or dead, but
can instead be seen as alive and constantly changing along with one’s self-understanding. The
attitude of effective historical consciousness is the proper attitude toward a text to produce
genuine or authentic self-understanding in the struggle to grasp what the text is saying. This
struggle is the process whereby we come to an authentic understanding of ourselves as beings that
exist in a common historical culture.
Gadamer’s critique of Hegel’s concept of experience helps to further illuminate the
importance of coming to terms with one’s finite historical condition for genuine or authentic selfunderstanding. For Hegel, in The Phenomenology of Mind, experience is the back and forth
movement of consciousness as it tries to understand something (Gadamer, 1986, p.310). This
dialectical movement ends with the total and absolute identification or unity of consciousness and
object. Charles Taylor in “Gadamer on the Human Sciences” claims that for Gadamer
“experience is that wherein our previous sense of reality is undone, refuted, and shows itself as
needing to be reconstituted. It occurs precisely in those moments where the object ‘talks back’”
(Taylor, 2002, p.128). As opposed to Hegel, Gadamer believes that experience as the movement
of consciousness will never reach a final perfect end point. For Gadamer, there is no absolute
knowledge that we can attain that overcomes our finitude and thrownness. What is instead gained
in experience is an understanding of limitation and finitude, i.e. the tradition that supports one’s
horizon. This understanding is the task of effective historical consciousness and the only path to
achieving authentic or genuine self-understanding for Gadamer. He writes,
real experience is that in which man becomes aware of his finiteness…‘To recognize
what is’ does not mean to recognize what is just at this moment there, but to have insight
into the limitations within which the future is still open to expectation and planning or
even more fundamentally, that all the expectation and planning of finite beings is finite
and limited. Thus true experience is that of one’s own historicality
(Gadamer, 1986, p.320-321).
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There is no absolute knowledge that overcomes one’s finitude and thrownness. This is something
that experience teaches us. The experienced man is one that is open and ready for experience
despite these finite limitations: “It is the historically experienced consciousness that, by
renouncing the chimera of perfect enlightenment, is open to the experience of history. We
described its realization as the fusion of the horizons of understanding” (Gadamer, 1986, p.340).
Being open to our finitude is being open to the prejudices that necessarily give meaning to our
lives and inform our identity. As discussed above, for Heidegger, coming to terms with one’s
historical finitude means anticipating death resolutely. For Gadamer, coming to terms with one’s
finitude is something that must be struggled over and worked out in the activity of understanding
itself; i.e. in the back and forth struggle whereby we allow something to speak for itself or reveal
itself on its own terms and in a way that has meaning for us and that we recognize. We therefore
do not become aware of ourselves as beings that are going to die, but as a member of a
community and historical culture with content and meaning.
The fusion of horizons also describes the result of a process whereby we have genuine
and authentic human relationships within which we develop authentic self-understanding in the
mutual recognition of authentic identity. Gadamer argues that the proper way to understand
someone and have a genuine relationship is not in a way that dominates and objectifies the other,
but is rather in a way that enters into an open conversation with someone in order to find common
ground. “The claim to understand the other person in advance performs the function of keeping
the claim of the other person at a distance.” (Gadamer, 1986, p.323). This distance is what we
find to be caused by petty racist stereotypes that objectify and dehumanize others. For example,
recognition of black dignity and humanity is what the civil rights movement struggled for. This
dignity and humanity was not generally recognized in black people by segments of society due to
the predominance of arbitrary racist prejudices that blocked genuine understanding. In all
genuine human relationships there is a back and forth struggle for mutual recognition that must
necessarily take place on both sides. This recognition requires the fusion of horizons. The civil
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rights movement forced many people to examine the petty racist prejudices that objectify and
dehumanize others. By holding racist prejudices, many of us are being inauthentic, since we do
not conform to the community standard of human treatment that many of us claim to value.
Although this standard is not shared by everyone, it is held by many in our society. This
community standard of human treatment is also shared by many black people, since they would
not demand it if it was not important to them. Many of us who live in this society value equal
treatment of all people, being true to this tradition – a tradition that is new and still contested by
many – means doing just that. However, this is not possible if one is blinded by racist stereotypes
that dehumanize others. We see the fusion of horizons when black people are recognized
authentically (as human beings that value treating all human beings with dignity) within a
common (to some) cultural tradition of treating all people with dignity and respect. At the same
time, one deepens one’s own understanding of oneself as a human being that values treating all
human beings with dignity and respect. This is only possible by dealing with the prejudices that
block understanding and make one inauthentic by valuing the equal treatment of all people, but
treating certain racial groups poorly. Authentic identity on Gadamer’s account is an identification
of oneself that is free from prejudices that hinder our understanding of ourselves and others. So it
is an understanding of oneself that is true to oneself and to the cultural tradition that provides
meaning and content to this identity. This authentic identity must be recognized by others along a
common horizon of significance and values in order to be meaningful. One’s identity is
meaningless if one is not understood authentically and genuinely by others; by the same token,
one cannot be authentic, open, and genuine if one is blind to one’s prejudices. “In human
relations the important thing is, as we have seen, to experience the ‘Thou’ truly as a ‘Thou,’ ie not
to overlook his claim and to listen to what he has to say to us. To this end, openness is necessary”
(Gadamer, 1986, p.324). With this openness to questioning our prejudices, we initiate a process
whereby we fuse of horizons with another person within a shared cultural tradition, and our
authentic identity as well as theirs can be mutually recognized in a meaningful way.
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One’s horizon language must be articulated if one is to be understood. Articulation here
is similar to translation. When we speak to make ourselves understood, we articulate or translate
our horizon language into verbal language, which can be understood by others. Without the
common forms of articulation that we share, recognition would not be possible, since dialogue
and discourse with others would not be possible. Civil rights leaders like Martin Luther King Jr.
and Malcolm X articulated their position in a way that forced people to examine the prejudices
that blocked them from understanding black people as human beings. The fusion of horizons only
takes place with dialogue and discourse, perhaps arguments, with the other that one does not at
first find meaningful; this is done not in order to dismiss the other as insane or meaningless, but
to genuinely understand the other and to allow them to speak for themselves in a meaningful way.
To recognize this other is to struggle to incorporate the articulation of their horizon into yours and
to recognize the common historical culture that informs the existence of both parties. In order to
do this, one must put one’s prejudices at risk in order to find the common language that will allow
for one to find what the other is saying to be meaningful and valuable. When this happens,
horizons are fused and the other is no longer other. “Without this kind of openness to one another
there is no genuine human relationship. Belonging together always also means being able to listen
to one another” (Gadamer, 1986, p.324).
As I discussed in the previous chapter, for Taylor, one’s authentic identity does not have
any meaning for others if it is not recognized within a common horizon of signification. Because
the horizon of the they is meaningless to an authentic individual on Heidegger’s account, this
individual cannot be recognized along a common horizon of significance and meaning. Without
this common horizon, one encounters the other as meaningless or other. This recognition is only
possible if one is open and authentic, allowing the other to freely reveal him or herself and speak
for him or herself. Genuine understanding of oneself is grasping one’s finitude and the tradition
that one relies on to make meaning in the world. This is achieved by fusing horizons, which
recognizes another within the common tradition and culture that give meaning to the lives of both
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parties, but only as the result of a struggle with one’s prejudicial fore-structure of interpretation
and the aspects of this that limit understanding.
We can also see on Gadamer’s and Taylor’s accounts the importance of recognition for
one’s day to day existence. People fight to be recognized because their authentic identities are
essentially valuable to them. Returning to the examples of Heidegger’s account of day to day
authenticity (Home Depot and Christian Dasein), there was no real meaningful difference in the
day to day lives of authentic people. However, for Caitlyn Jenner, Rachel Dolezal and millions of
black people, authenticity and its necessary recognition is very important. While these struggles
are not over, amendments to laws that prohibit racial demonstrate the impact that this sort of
recognition has made over the last fifty years in the day to day lives of many black people. This
failure of recognition has real consequences to the way that Dolezal lives her life and takes care
of things that matter to her; when the black community that she was a part of discovered that she
is actually a white lady, she was forced to resign her position with the NAACP. While I do not
agree that Dolezal’s claim is valid, we can see the impact that not being recognized has for her
day to day life. Unlike in Heidegger, we can see here the consequences of authentic identity in the
everyday lives of people that struggle to be recognized.
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CONCLUSION
As discussed above, authenticity for Heidegger means that being is no longer closed off
by entanglement, but rather beings are free to reveal themselves to Dasein as they are according
to the fore-structure of understanding that Dasein is thrown into. Authenticity is an openness of
understanding, which is no longer closed off by the ways that Dasein falls prey. This openness or
authenticity comes about via an anxious flash of insight at the moment that we anticipate death
resolutely. When we do this, our understanding is opened and things reveal themselves genuinely
(i.e. Dasein’s being is authentic).
For Gadamer, we must also be open in order to genuinely understand or be authentic. The
important thing is that this openness is achieved for Gadamer in the working out of our
prejudicial limitations in a process of open and questioning dialogical or dialectic exchange of
discourse. Taylor writes “the road to understanding others passes through the patient
identification and undoing of those facets of our implicit understanding that distort the reality of
the other” (Taylor, 2002, p.132). Because of the way that authenticity or genuine understanding is
achieved for Gadamer, authenticity is not something absolute like it is for Heidegger; it is not
something that one turns on like a light switch. Rather for Gadamer authenticity admits of
degrees; the process of genuine understanding never reaches a final end point, and one’s tradition
is always alive and in constant change and flux as it is bound up with collective selfunderstanding within the horizon of a meaningful cultural tradition. Instead of Heidegger’s stark
authentic/inauthentic distinction, for Gadamer, our understanding changes and broadens with
experiences of the other that force us to work through and struggle with our prejudices in order to
grasp the aspects of tradition and culture that give meaning to our lives and the lives of others.
Following Charles Taylor, I argued that one’s authentic being must be recognized by
others if it is to have any meaning. I identifie argued that this recognition is missing from
Heidegger’s account of authenticity because of the deeply personal and internal disposition of the
resolute anticipation of one’s death. Because this anticipation effects the motivation for action
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and not the content, there is no way for the community to know whether or not another Dasein is
authentic. By the same token, because the common sense interpretation is meaningless to
authentic Dasein, he or she does not identify him or herself in a way that makes sense to the; this
is the case despite the fact that authentic Dasein must continue to live out its finite existence it
amongst these others that it was thrown into.
Gadamer builds on Taylor’s ideas about meaningful recognition. In order to fuse horizons,
one’s horizon must be recognized by the other within the same process as one tries to understand
this other in a genuine or authentic way. This recognition takes place via the articulation of one’s
horizon in dialogue and discourse with the other. This articulation in discourse allows for the
struggle for recognition to play out. The struggle to recognize the other forces one to put one’s
prejudices at risk and find the common ground or language (what Taylor calls a ‘shared horizon
of experience’) that will allow the other to speak for him/herself and express him/herself in a
genuine or authentic. The end result of the fusion is that the other is able to freely reveal him or
herself in a genuine or authentic way and we see ourselves more authentically as finite historical
beings within a shared culture or tradition. Understanding others “always involves the attainment
of a higher universality that overcomes, not only our own particularity, but also that of the other.
The concept of the ‘horizon’ suggests itself because it expresses the wide, superior vision that the
person who is seeking to understand must have” (Gadamer, 1986, p.272). The only way to
achieve this wider and more open horizon (what Heidegger would call authentic understanding),
is to enter into dialogue with the other and put one’s prejudices at risk as one struggles to
understand what does not fit into one’s horizon language.
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